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This paper embeds the ￿nancial accelerator into a medium-scale DSGE model and esti-
mates it using Bayesian methods. Incorporation of ￿nancial frictions enhances the model￿ s
description of the main macroeconomic aggregates. The ￿nancial accelerator accounts for
approximately ten percent of monetary policy transmission. The model-consistent pre-
mium for external ￿nance compares well to observable proxies of the premium, such as
the high-yield spread. Fluctuations in the external ￿nance premium are primarily driven
by investment supply and monetary policy shocks. In terms of recession prediction, false
signals of the premium can be given an economic interpretation.
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11 Introduction
This paper incorporates the agency cost framework of Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999)
into a DSGE model of the type analysed by Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2005) and Smets
and Wouters (2003, 2005, 2006). We estimate the model on post-war US data using Bayesian
techniques. We ￿rst assess whether ￿nancial frictions help in describing the main macroeconomic
aggregates. We then quantify the contribution of the broad credit channel to the transmission
of monetary policy (and other) shocks. From the model, we extract a time series of the external
￿nance premium. We discuss its relation to observable proxies of the premium and to shocks
driving business cycles.
The reference model of contemporary business cycle research is the so-called New Keynesian
or New Neoclassical Synthesis Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) model. Chris-
tiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2005) show that a medium-scale version of this model is able
to replicate the dynamic response of US macroeconomic aggregates to a monetary policy shock.
Smets and Wouters (2003, 2005, 2006) extend the model to a wider set of shocks and frictions, and
-following Schorfheide (2000)- estimate it using Bayesian methods. Their results indicate that the
current strand of DSGE models is able to compete on empirical grounds with purely data driven
approaches, such as (Bayesian) VAR￿ s. The present paper combines two observations related to
the New Keynesian model. First, empirically, there is room for improvement in the standard
model. In particular, Smets and Wouters (2006) document a relatively poor forecasting perfor-
mance of the DSGE model with respect to investment. Second, theoretically, one maintained
assumption in the prototypical New Keynesian model is that of frictionless capital markets. The
seminal contribution of Bernanke and Gertler (1989) and a number of subsequent calibration
studies, most notably Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997) and Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999),
document how relaxing the perfect capital market assumption can generate additional features
2observed in macroeconomic data.
Additionally, an enormous amount of microeconometric studies aims to quantify the extent of
￿nancial frictions to ￿rm investment (see, e.g., Hubbard 1998 and the references cited therein).
We complement this research from a macroeconomic point of view. Speci￿cally, we estimate
the external ￿nance premium, which is essentially unobservable, on the basis of macroeconomic
data. Our approach provides a number of contributions relative to the microeconometric one.
First, the model allows an interpretation of ￿ uctuations in the external ￿nance premium in terms
of shocks driving the economy. Second, from a historical perspective, data availability enables
an investigation of the premium for the entire post-WWII period. Third, from a cross-sectional
perspective, the model-consistent premium is exhaustive in coverage. By contrast, both micro
estimates and readily available proxies of the external ￿nance premium typically focus on limited
time periods or subsets of ￿rms, or both.
A number of related papers also take ￿nancial friction models to the data. Levin, Natalucci
and Zakraj￿ ek (2004), on the one hand, exploit the microeconomic framework of Bernanke,
Gertler and Gilchrist (1999). They estimate the underlying structural parameters using a sam-
ple of US ￿rms over the most recent business cycle. Subsequently, they analyse variations in the
external ￿nance premium over time and ￿rms. On the other hand, a couple of papers subsume
that a coherent macroeconomic framework can aid in the estimation of the magnitude of ￿nancial
frictions. Meier and M￿ller (2006) estimate the elasticity of the premium in response to a mon-
etary policy shock using minimum distance estimation. Christensen and Dib (2005) conduct a
similar exercise using maximum likelihood techniques. The Bayesian approach enables a variety
of model comparison exercises, as in Neri (2004) and Queijo (2005), who measure the relative
contribution of a number of frictions, including ￿nancial imperfections. The present paper also
adresses credit market frictions from the macroeconomic point of view. However, we take the va-
riety of real and nominal frictions for granted. Their importance has been established elsewhere,
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and the references cited therein. We do test the contribution of the ￿nancial accelerator relative
to the standard model, but take the model one step further and analyse its implications for mon-
etary policy transmission and the external ￿nance premium. These implications are interesting
on their own, irrespective of whether the model delivers a better description of macroeconomic
aggregates. In this respect, the interest of the paper is closer to the analysis of Levin, Natalucci
and Zakraj￿ ek (2004) than the aforementioned macroeconomic studies.
To anticipate our results, we ￿nd a substantial role for ￿nancial market imperfections. Incor-
poration of the ￿nancial accelerator further improves the prototypicial New Keynesian model￿ s
ability to mimic the dynamics of the main macroeconomic aggregates. Furthermore, we perform
a quantitative assessment of the strength of the ￿nancial accelerator. Our ￿ndings suggest that,
in terms of GDP, 10% of monetary policy transmission is due to the existence of ￿nancial mar-
ket imperfections. The estimated steady state premium for external ￿nance in the US is 150
basis points. The premium exhibits a signi￿cant negative reaction to changes in entrepreneurial
net worth. We provide a model-consistent time series of the external ￿nance premium over the
post-war period. Our estimate of the external ￿nance premium bears close resemblance to some
observable indicators of ￿nancial distress. Moreover, historical ￿ uctuations in the premium are
driven primarily by investment supply shocks, and secondly, by monetary policy shocks. Finally,
although the external ￿nance premium is generally a good predictor of recessions, supply shocks
occasionaly have induced false predictions.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we present the log-linearized version of the
model. Section 3 discusses the estimation procedure and results. The paper then focuses on the
implications for the ￿nancial accelerator (Section 4) and the external ￿nance premium (Section
5). Section 6 concludes.
42 Theoretical framework
The model we propose is a version of the standard New Keynesian / New Neoclassical Synthesis
model, analysed in detail in Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2005) and Smets and Wouters
(2003, 2006). The economy consists of households, ￿nal and intermediate goods producers, and
a monetary authority. Moreover, as in Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999) and Christiano,
Motto and Rostagno (2003), we introduce a ￿nancial intermediary, capital goods producers and
entrepreneurs. Since these models are quite well-known, we refrain from a full-blown exposition
of their ￿rst principles. To make the paper self-contained, this section presents the log-linearized
version of the model that we estimate. For details, we refer the reader to the original papers.
Households maximize utility by trading o⁄ current consumption with future consumption
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Apart from the standard terms in future consumption and the real interest rate ^ Rt (= ^ Rn
t ￿
Et^ ￿t+1), this particular consumption process derives from habit persistence (of the "catching-up
with the Joneses" form) and non-separable utility in labor (^ Lt) and consumption. Consumption
is more persistent for larger values of the habit parameter h. Moreover, for ￿c > 1, there exists
some complementarity between labor and consumption. The ￿nal term involving ^ "
B
t represents
a shock to the discount factor ￿, a⁄ecting intertemporal substitution decisions.
Households￿labor supply is di⁄erentiated which, in combination with partial indexation of
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5where ^ wt and ^ ￿t denote wage and price in￿ ation, respectively. ￿ ￿t is the central bank￿ s in￿ ation
objective. With (Calvo) probability 1￿￿w a household gets to reoptimize its wage in period t. It
does so taking into account both current and future marginal costs. The term in square brackets
bears some resemblance to an error-correction term, in which the actual wage is drawn towards
its ￿ exible price counterpart. The intratemporal trade-o⁄ between consumption and work is
subject to a labor supply shock ^ "
L
t . The lagging terms in the wage equation result from the
partial indexation assumption, parametrized through ￿w. Finally, this speci￿cation also allows
for temporary deviations from the equilibrium wage mark-up ￿w, as captured by the shock ￿W
t .
The ￿rm sector consists of a continuum of monopolistically competitive intermediate goods
￿rms. Their output is combined to produce ￿nal goods, which are sold in a perfectly competitive
market. The aggregate conditions resulting from these agents￿optimization are standard. Ag-
gregate supply stems from the typical Cobb-Douglas production function augmented with ￿xed
costs and variable capital utilization:
^ Yt = ￿^ "
A
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where ￿ is one plus the share of ￿xed costs in production, ￿ the capital share in the production
function, and   represents the elasticity of the capital utilization cost function. ^ Kt denotes capital
and ^ rk
t its rental rate. Variation in total factor productivity is captured by ^ "
A
t .
Labor demand increases with the rental rate of capital and decreases with that of labor:
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Similar to wages, non-reoptimized prices are partially (￿p) indexed to past in￿ ation. Due
to Calvo-signals, each period only a fraction 1 ￿ ￿p of ￿rms gets to reoptimize. The resulting
6in￿ ation dynamics are captured by the following process:
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In an environment of price rigidity ￿rms will, in addition to current marginal costs (in square
brackets), take into account expected future marginal costs, giving rise to the forward looking in-
￿ ation term. The backward looking part follows from partial indexation. The term ￿P
t represents
a price mark-up shock.
As in Christiano, Motto and Rostagno (2003), capital goods producers work in a perfectly
competitive environment and face costs to changing the ￿ ow of investment. The capital stock
evolves according to:
^ Kt+1 = (1 ￿ ￿) ^ Kt + ￿ ^ It + ￿^ "
I
t
where ￿ is the depreciation rate, ^ It stands for investment and ^ "
I
t represents a shock to the
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where ^ Qt is the real value of installed capital and ’ is the investment adjustment cost para-
meter.
Entrepreneurs buy the capital stock Kt+1 from capital goods producers at a given price
Qt, using both internal funds (net worth, Nt+1) and loans from the bank. Subsequently, they
transform it using their technology, decide on capital utilization and rent out capital services to
intermediate goods ￿rms at a rate ^ rk
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where ￿ RK denotes the steady state return to capital and similarly, ￿ rk the steady state rental
rate.
7Following the costly state veri￿cation framework of Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999),
however, entrepreneurs cannot borrow at the riskless rate. The cost of external ￿nance di⁄ers
from the risk-free rate because entrepreneurial output is unobservable from the point of view of
the ￿nancial intermediary. In order to infer the realized return of the entrepreneur, the bank has
to pay a (state veri￿cation) cost. The bank monitors those entrepreneurs that default, pays the
cost and seizes the remaining funds. In equilibrium, entrepreneurs borrow up to the point where
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The parameter ￿ measures the elasticity of the external ￿nance premium to variations in
entrepreneurial ￿nancial health. As shown explicitly in Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999),
the premium over the risk-free rate the ￿nancial intermediary demands is a negative function of
the amount of collateralized net worth. The higher the entrepreneur￿ s stake in the project, the
lower the associated moral hazard. In case entrepreneurs have su¢ cient net worth to ￿nance the
entire capital stock, agency problems vanish, the risk-free rate and the return to capital coincide,
and the model reduces to the model of Smets and Wouters (2006)1.
Aggregate entrepreneurial net worth accumulates according to:
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where ￿ is the entrepreneurial survival rate and
￿ K
￿ N is the steady state ratio of capital to net
worth (or the inverse leverage ratio)2.
1One di⁄erence with Smets and Wouters (2006) is the absence of an "equity premium shock" in our model.
They include this shock as a non-structural proxy for ￿uctuations in the external ￿nance premium. When we
incorporate such a shock in the model with the ￿nancial accelerator, its variability is drawn to zero.
2We rewrite the model without the bankruptcy cost (￿) and default threshold (￿ !) parameters of Bernanke et
al. (1999). There are a couple advantages related to conducting such a substitution. First, it allows one to refrain
from assumptions about the distribution of idiosynchratic productivity shocks, as well as its parameters. Second,
8The standard goods market equilibrium condition is augmented with terms capturing the
costs of variable capital utilization and bankruptcy:
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where cy and ky denote the steady state ratio of consumption and capital to output, and "G
t
can loosely be interpreted as a government spending shock.
As in Smets and Wouters (2003) the model is closed with the following empirical monetary
policy reaction function:
^ Rn
t = ￿ ^ Rn
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where the central bank output objective ^ Y
p
t is the ￿ exible price, ￿ exible wage, frictionless
credit market, equilibrium. The ￿rst two terms capture the standard Taylor rule. The terms
involving ￿rst di⁄erences can be seen as the allowance for "speed limit policies", as in Walsh
(2003). The reaction function also contains two monetary policy shocks. The ￿rst is a temporary
interest rate shock ￿R
t . The second policy shock, ￿￿
t , captures changes in the authority￿ s in￿ ation
target ￿ ￿t (= ￿ ￿t￿1 + ￿￿
t ).
this approach avoids a number of computational di¢ culties, as in Meier and M￿ller (2005). Third and more
important, it enables us to directly estimate ￿ RK, and thus the external ￿nance premium. Finally, the remaining
parameters can be thought of to arise in related frameworks. One particular strand of models we have in mind is
that of costly enforcement (e.g. Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997). Although the underlying microeconomic assumptions
are entirely di⁄erent, these models give rise to similar acceleration phenomena.
93 Estimation results
3.1 Estimation strategy
The log-linearized version of the model is estimated using Bayesian methods. These methods use
information from existing microeconometric and calibration evidence on behavioural parameters
and update it with new information as captured by the likelihood. While estimation serves to
increase the degree of dynamic ￿t of DSGE models it is not guaranteed to provide insight in the
structural parameters of the underlying models. By contrast, purely calibration based approaches
are unlikely to provide a good time-series characterization of the data relative to likelihood-based
approaches. As stressed by Lubik and Schorfheide (2005), the combination of prior and sample
information into a posterior distribution provides a meaningful compromise between calibration
and (likelihood-based) estimation.
We use the priors of Smets and Wouters (2006) for the parameters we share with their model3.
The last three columns of Table 1 present the prior distributions. For a thorough discussion of
prior elicitation, identi￿cation and estimation methodology, we refer the reader to Smets and
Wouters (2003). We discuss the priors on the ￿nancial accelerator parameters in more detail.
For the steady state premium on external ￿nance ( ￿ RK ￿ R) we use a normal distribution with
mean equal to 200 basis points, a value commonly used in calibration exercises (e.g. Bernanke,
Gertler and Gilchrist 1999). Its prior standard deviation is set at 80 basis points. In terms
of the (quarterly) model, we assume ￿ RK ￿ Normal(1:0149;0:002)4. The steady state inverse
3With respect to the shock variances, we divert from the priors of Smets and Wouters (2005). They employ
Inverse-Gamma prior distributions. When we estimate the model using their priors, the posterior distribution
of one of the shocks￿variance is bimodal, with one mode purely driven by the prior. Since most of the shock
variances do not have clear economic interpretations, we set truly uniformative priors, by means of the Uniform
distribution.
4The steady state level of the risk-free interest rate is undisputed throughout current macroeconomic research.
Here too, it is calibrated (or given a very strict prior) such that R = 4% annualy.
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￿ K
￿ N has a Normal prior with mean 2, the value used in most calibration exercises,
and a standard deviation of 0:2. Based on Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999), Carlstrom
and Fuerst (1997) and others, the prior for the entrepreneurial death rate is ￿ ￿ Beta(0:97;0:02).
The elasticity of the external ￿nance premium ￿ has a Normal(0:05;0:02) prior distribution. We
set its mean at the value commonly used in calibrations, while its standard deviation is such that
it encompasses the estimates of Meier and M￿ller (2006) and Christensen and Dib (2005). We
set fairly di⁄use priors on the ￿nancial accelerator parameters, since we hope the data are very
informative in this respect.
We estimate the model on quarterly US data from 1947:1 to 2004:4. The set of observable
variables consists of real GDP, consumption, investment, real wages, hours worked, prices and the
short-term interest rate (Y , C, I, W, L, P, R). These variables constitute the set of observables in
Smets and Wouters (2006). Nominal variables are de￿ ated by the GDP-de￿ ator. Aggregate real
variables are expressed in per capita terms. All variables (except hours) are linearly detrended.
Posterior simulation is done via a random walk Metropolis-Hastings algorithm on a chain of
250000 draws. We monitor convergence in a variety of ways. In particular, following Bauwens,
Lubrano and Richard (2003), we track the standardized CUMSUM statistic and perform an
equality in means test between the ￿rst and last 30% of posterior draws for each parameter.
3.2 Parameter estimates
We present the ￿nancial accelerator parameter estimates in Table 1. The estimated steady state
rate of return to capital is 1:0139 on a quarterly basis. The posterior simulations reveal that,
even though the estimate is not very precise, it di⁄ers signi￿cantly from the risk-free interest
rate (1:0101 quarterly). Converted to a yearly basis, we ￿nd a premium for external ￿nance of
approximately 150 basis points. Moreover, we estimate ￿ to be 6% and signi￿cantly di⁄erent from
zero. Starting from steady state, and holding all else equal, a one standard deviation increase in
11entrepreneurial net worth results in a reduction of the external ￿nance premium of approximately
70 basis points. The estimated value of the elasticity is very close to that of Meier and M￿ller
(2006). The highest posterior density region on this parameter rejects the point estimate of 9%
in Christensen and Dib (2005)5.
The estimates of the non-￿nancial parameters are reported in the lower part of Table 1 and in
Table 2. Overall, parameters that we share with Smets and Wouters (2006) are fairly similar. The
di⁄erences between the estimates arise because of di⁄erences in sample period and detrending
procedure, as well as the inclusion of the ￿nancial accelerator. Among the similarities, we ￿nd a
considerable amount of rigidity in both wages and prices and a signi￿cant elasticity of the capital
utilization cost function. Although consumption habits are signi￿cant, our point estimate is low
relative to the one in Smets and Wouters (2006).
Several diagnostics suggest the chain of posterior draws converges. In particular, after a
su¢ ciently long burn-in period, the standardized CUMSUM statistic for all parameters ￿ uctuates
around the ￿nal estimate with a relative error of below 10%. Moreover, for each parameter, a
test between the mean of the ￿rst 30% (after burn-in) and last 30% of draws never rejects the
hypothesis of equality. This reinforces the evidence in favor of stability of the draws6. The
algorithm attains an acceptance rate of 28%.
4 The Financial Accelerator
Starting in the early nineties, a vast body of research focuses attention to an examination of
the relevance of the credit channel in monetary policy transmission. Most of the existing ev-
idence investigates cross-sectional di⁄erences in ￿rm investment and ￿nancing conditions (see,
5As a robustness check, we change the prior mean of the elasticity to 0:07, in view of Christensen and Dib￿ s
(2005) estimate of 9%. In this case too, our point estimate for the elasticity is drawn towards 6%.
6Moreover, di⁄erent initializations of the chain converge to the same stationary distribution.
12e.g., Gertler and Gilchrist 1994). While there is an awareness that credit frictions (can) a⁄ect ￿rm
investment, its economy-wide impact is largely unknown. This void follows from the microecono-
metric nature of these studies, which precludes a quantitative evaluation of the macroeconomic
importance of the broad credit channel. We assess the contribution of ￿nancial frictions in two
ways. We ￿rst measure the model￿ s statistical performance relative to the standard New Key-
nesian DSGE model. Second, we document the contribution of the ￿nancial accelerator to the
transmission of shocks.
As a measure of statistical comparative model performance, we compute the marginal density
of our model p(Y TjM1), where Y T and M1 denote the set of observables and the model including
the accelerator, respectively. We then compare it with the predictive performance of the model
without credit frictions, p(Y TjM0). The resulting Bayes factor is
p(Y
TjM1)
p(Y TjM0) = e17. This suggests
(placing equal prior probability on each model) the model with the ￿nancial accelerator performs
substantially better in matching the dynamic behaviour of (Y , C, I, W, L, P, R) relative to the
model without the ￿nancial accelerator. Neri (2004), Christensen and Dib (2005) and Queijo
(2005) also favor model speci￿cations that incorporate ￿nancial frictions. Meier and M￿ller
(2006), by contrast, ￿nd the ￿nancial accelerator to contribute only marginally to describing the
e⁄ects of monetary policy shocks.
One of the reasons underlying the improved empirical performance of our model relative to
that of e.g. Smets and Wouters (2006) is the following. The latter model generates crowding out
e⁄ects between consumption and investment following preference and investment supply shocks.
Greenwood, Hercowitz and Krusell (2000) show that the consumption response to an investment
supply shock is a priori uncertain7. In the present model, the estimated parameters generate a
7This is due to two opposing e⁄ects. On the one hand, following a positive investment supply shock, there is
a shift away from consumption to investment, in response to the latter￿ s increased rate of return. On the other
hand, increased investment serves to increase production, demand and thus consumption.
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and Straub (2005) too ￿nd, using sign restrictions on VAR￿ s, that such crowding out e⁄ects
are not evident in the data. The data seem to contain many eposides of comovement between
consumption and investment, rather than crowding out e⁄ects between the two. Another case
in which this is evident is the preference shock, "B. As in Smets and Wouters (2006) we ￿nd
that this shock crowds out investment. However, we ￿nd a substantially smaller variance of the
shock in comparison to their estimate.
Figure 1 plots the response of output to one standard deviation impulses to all shocks in the
model, both with and without the ￿nancial accelerator. To compute the response barring capital
market frictions, we simulate the model under ￿ = 0 and RK = 1
￿.8 The ￿gures also contain the
90% con￿dence interval of the di⁄erence in responses.
The response of output to both monetary policy shocks exhibits the prototypical acceleration
e⁄ect, as in the calibration of Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999). Qualitatively, the addi-
tional e⁄ect generated by the ￿nancial accelerator implies a signi￿cant increase in the potence
of monetary policy during the ￿rst ten to ￿fteen quarters following the shock. Quantitatively,
the contribution of the ￿nancial accelerator to monetary policy transmission amounts to approx-
imately 10% of the total output response9.
For the other shocks, the picture is somewhat more complicated. With respect to the three
supply shocks, the ￿nancial accelerator ampli￿es the immediate impact of a shock, yet reduces
their medium term responses. After a number of periods, the output response to an investment
supply shock becomes negative. The reason is that the subtantial fall in the price of capital (or
8Conditional on credit frictions being absent, the values of ￿ and
￿ K
￿ N are irrelevant. In this case, they only
contribute to the evolution of net worth, which is then immaterial. Moreover, the latter ratio is, by the Modigliani-
Miller theorem, indeterminate.
9More precisely, the average di⁄erence in impulse responses over the ￿rst 20 quarters is 9% for in￿ation
objective and 11% for interest rate shocks.
14rise in relative e¢ ciency of investment) advances the optimal timing of investment. Moreover,
for this shock there is hardly any ampli￿cation. This follows from the ensuing rise in the external
￿nance premium, mitigating the investment response. The increase in the premium is due to
the reduction in net worth which, in turn, is caused by the fall in Q. The mild response of
investment relative to the model without ￿nancial frictions also rationalizes its comovement
with consumption. A stronger response of investment to "I would aggravate substitution e⁄ects
between investment and consumption.
We observe the mirror e⁄ect of the ￿nancial accelerator on the output reaction following a
government spending shock. Here, the impact e⁄ect on output is small relative to the credit-
frictionless response, albeit more persistent. Thus, depending on the particular shock under
consideration, ampli￿cation and persistence can both rise and fall due to the inclusion of the
￿nancial accelerator. In the estimated model, however, the presence of ￿nancial frictions does
not generate additional propagation relative to the nominal and real frictions of Christiano,
Eichenbaum and Evans (2005) and Smets and Wouters (2006). In terms of Figure 1, the peak
response of the model without frictions never predates that of the overall model. Finally, with
respect to preference and mark-up shocks the di⁄erences in transmission between the two models
are negligable. The di⁄erences in impulse responses are either statistically insigni￿cant ("B and
￿P) or economically very small (￿W).
5 The external ￿nance premium
The previous section aimed to provide evidence of ￿nancial accelerator e⁄ects in macroeconomic
data. One of the reasons why macroeconomic evidence on ￿nancial frictions is scarse is because
one of the central variables of these theories, viz. the external ￿nance premium, is unobservable.
In the present section, we ￿rst estimate the model-consistent premium. As a means of external
15validation, we then compare our estimate with a number of observable proxies of the premium.
Finally, we interpret movements in the premium in relation to shocks driving the business cycle.
5.1 A time series of the premium
Figure 2 plots the external ￿nance premium implied by the model. Shaded areas denote NBER
recessions. From the ￿gure, it is evident that almost all of the post-war recessions are preceeded
by substantial (relative) increases in the premium. The leading character of the premium relative
to the business cycle arises naturally in the model: While output responds relatively slow due to
real (and nominal) frictions, the premium reacts instantaneously. The premium is low relative to
its steady state level during most of the sixties, seventies and eighties. Following this prolonged
period of relatively low external ￿nancing costs, the premium experiences a steady rise peaking
prior to the early nineties recession. After this recession the external ￿nance premium returns
towards its steady state level. Starting in the middle nineties, another surge initiates, ending
with the early millenium slowdown.
5.2 An external validation exercise
It is of interest to know to what extent our estimate relates to other indicators of the external
￿nance premium suggested in the literature. On the one hand, there are a number of readily
available series that bear on the premium for external ￿nance. Among these, the most widely
used are the prime spread (prime loan rate-federal funds rate) and the corporate bond spread
(Baa-Aaa). Gertler and Lown (1999) argue that in the last two decennia, the high-yield bond
spread (<Bbb-Aaa) emerges as particularly useful indicator of the external ￿nance premium and
￿nancial conditions more generally. On the other hand, using microeconomic data on a sample
of US ￿rms Levin, Natalucci and Zakraj￿ ek (2004) provide an estimate of the premium over
the most recent business cycle. Figure 3 plots these indicators joint with our estimate of the
16premium.
Only the prime and corporate bond spread are available over the entire sample period. Over-
all, the relation between our estimate and the former two series is rather weak. The correlations
amount to ￿37% (corporate) and 20% (prime). Nevertheless, they share a number of important
characteristics. For one, they all rise around the time of a recession. There is, however, a dif-
ference in timing, especially with respect to the prime spread, which lags a couple of quarters10.
Second, the hike in the mid-sixties that was not followed by a recession is observable in all three
indicators. Similarly, the substantial decrease in the premium following the 1973-75 recession
is also apparent. In the late eighties, with the emergence of a market for below investment
grade corporate bonds, an additional indicator comes to the fore. Gertler and Lown (1999) show
that the high-yield spread is strongly associated with both general ￿nancial conditions and the
business cycle (as predicted by the ￿nancial accelerator). Along the lines of their arguments, we
believe this spread to be a more thorough indicator of the external ￿nance premium, relative to
the two proxies discussed above. In particular, the prime loan spread is a poor indication for
￿nancing conditions of ￿rms typically deemed vulnerable to ￿nancial frictions. It focuses on ￿rms
of the highest credit quality, upon which ￿nancial constraints impinge the least. The (Baa-Aaa)
corporate bond spread accounts for this discrepancy too some extent, by isolating developments
speci￿c to ￿rms that have a less solid ￿nancial status. Evidently, this argument holds a fortiori
for the high-yield spread. As shown in Figure 3, our estimate of the external ￿nance premium
is closely related to this high-yield spread. Although our estimate misses most of the high fre-
quency movements in the high-yield spread, the longer frequencies have more aligned patterns.
10The lagging character of the prime spread is noticeable over the entire sample. The sluggish response of retail
bank interest rates has spurred a vast amount of independent research. Due to the interest rate hikes in the early
70￿ s, the rigidity of loan rates occasionaly resulted in negative spreads. Moreover, starting in 1994, the prime
spread ceases to be a useful indicator of ￿uctuations in the external ￿nance premium. From then onwards the
prime loan rate is set as the federal funds rate plus 3 percent.
17As a rough approximation, our estimate almost envelopes the high-yield spread. The correlation
between the two series is 68%. Finally, the graph also contains the premium as estimated by
Levin, Natalucci and Zakraj￿ ek (2004). They estimate the premium on the basis of micro data
by exploiting the microeconomic friction underlying the model of Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist
(1999). As in the case of the high-yield spread, its behaviour and relation to our estimate of the
premium are very similar. Given the enormous di⁄erence in empirical approach this similarity
is somewhat surprising, yet comforting.
In conclusion, our estimate of the premium for external ￿nance seems to have a substantial
realistic content. It is closely related to readily available proxies of the premium. Using macro-
economic data we establish roughly the same behaviour of the premium as Levin, Natalucci and
Zakraj￿ ek (2004), who estimate ￿rm-level premia. Due to the span of the data in the present
analysis, however, we are able to generalize these properties over a more comprehensive set of
economic cycles. One advantage of our estimate relative to the indicators suggested in the liter-
ature is its coverage. By estimating the premium on the basis of macroeconomic data, it should
cover the entirety of US ￿rms. By contrast, other indicators typically pertain to a speci￿c subset
of ￿rms11. Another advantage follows from distilling the premium out of a full-￿ edged DSGE
model. Hence, one can interpret movements in the premium in relation to structural shocks
driving the economy, as the next section illustrates.
11Although we do not push this issue any further, this economy-wide coverage might explain a number of
observations related to the model. First, by means of the law of large numbers, it is consistent with our estimate
of the premium not sharing high-frequency movements observed in indicators for subsets of ￿rms. Second, this
wide coverage possibly generates the wide range of the highest posterior density region of the steady state cost of
external ￿nance, ￿ RK.
185.3 Decomposing the premium
Table 3 and Figures 4 and 5 provide variance and historical decompositions of the external ￿nance
premium and GDP. Such decompositions provide insight into the manner in which the model
interprets movements of the premium and the business cycle.
First, it seems that investment supply shocks are the primary source of ￿ uctuations in the
premium. In the short run investment supply shocks account for about half to two-thirds of the
forecast error variance of the premium. At longer horizons, this percentage increases to around
90%. The historical decomposition of the premium in Figure 4 con￿rms that investment supply
shocks are responsible for the bulk of variations in the external ￿nance premium. The graph
traces the low frequency component of the premium very closely. Not only for the premium, but
also for the business cycle the role of investment supply shocks is substantial. We ￿nd that the
contribution of these shocks to GDP ranges from a lower bound of 13% (at long horizon) to an
upper bound of 34% (immediate). This is somewhat higher than in Smets and Wouters (2006)
and is more in line with the ￿ndings of Greenwood, Hercowitz and Krusell (2000). They attribute
up to 30% of business cycle ￿ uctuations to these shocks. Moreover, the substantial increases in
the premium due to "I in the second half of the sample are consistent with the increased role of
technological investment since the mid-seventies (Greenwood and Yorukoglu, 1997).
Second, monetary policy shocks also cause a great deal of movements in the premium. Table 3
shows that the in￿ ation objective and monetary policy shock jointly account for 10 to 35% of the
short run ￿ uctuations of the premium. Importantly, the model interprets the early eighties surge
in the premium as being largely driven by the Fed￿ s disin￿ ationary policy. The corresponding
recession is also attributed to the stance of monetary policy, as is evident from the historical
decomposition of GDP. Following the 2001 recession, favorable monetary policy shocks have
contributed to the reduction of the external ￿nance premium.
19Third, we also ￿nd a small, yet signi￿cant contribution of preference shocks (4￿12%) to the
short horizon variance decomposition of the premium. Another minor portion (6% on average) of
the high frequency movements in the premium is generated by labor supply shocks. Government
spending as wel as both mark-up shocks have only minor e⁄ects on the premium. The price and
wage mark-up shocks also have a small e⁄ect on output ￿ uctuations. The government spending
shock, by contrast, generates most of the short horizon and a substantial part of the long horizon
variance of GDP.
Finally, historical contributions can also shed light on the leading indicator properties of the
external ￿nance premium. In particular, consider the peaks in the external ￿nance premium
during the early ￿fties and mid-sixties in Figure 2. These peaks did not signal a recession.
Historical decompositions can provide insight into these episodes, which would be labelled "false
signals" from a forecasting perspective. The surge in the premium in 1950 is driven almost
entirely by positive investment supply shocks, as shown by the second peak in its contribution
in Figure 4. The increase in the second half of the sixties is mainly the result of increases in
total factor productivity. Both these shocks induce a positive correlation between GDP and the
external ￿nance premium. The reason is that the borrowing needs of ￿rms ultimately rise. After
a productivity shock, for instance, the increase in investment opportunities surmounts the rise
in private net worth. While the premium rises consequently, this does not prevail the substantial
positive output response, thus creating the false signal. In addition, the favorable business cycle
stance during these episodes was supported by positive contributions of government spending
and -too a lesser extent- price mark-up shocks. Both these shocks have limited e⁄ects on the
premium.
206 Conclusion
This paper incorporates the ￿nancial accelerator of Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999) into
a medium-scale, empirically able DSGE model of the type described by Christiano, Eichenbaum
and Evans (2005) and Smets and Wouters (2003). This combined model allows us to address a
number of important issues. We ￿rst measure the contribution of the ￿nancial accelerator to the
standard model, in both statistical and economic terms. We ￿nd that the marginal likelihood
of the standard New Keynesian model increases substantially when a ￿nancial accelerator is
accounted for. Moreover, the model is consistent with a number of independent observations.
These include, the relatively high importance of investment supply shocks in generating business
cycles (as in Greenwood, Hercowitz and Krusell 2000), and the comovement of investment and
consumption in response to such shocks (as in Peersman and Straub 2005). The model also allows
an assessment of the signi￿cance and the quantitative importance of the ￿nancial accelerator as
a transmission mechanism of monetary policy. In particular, posterior simulations of the model
suggest that the proportion of monetary transmission due to ￿nancial frictions is 10%. While this
is a signi￿cant contribution, it also makes clear that these e⁄ects should not be overstated. The
￿nancial accelerator really is a complement to the traditional channels of policy transmission.
A second line of inquiry focuses on the external ￿nance premium. In essence, this premium
is unobservable. While there exist a number of observable indicators, each of them is, in a sense,
imperfect. We provide a model-consistent estimate of the premium and its ￿ uctuations over the
post-WWII era. While this estimate too, has its limitations, a number of interesting implications
can be derived from it. Recessions are typically preceeded by surges in the premium. From a
leading indicator perspective, however, the reverse is not true. The estimated premium, as well
as existing indicators, exhibit a number of peaks that were not followed by a recession. One
advantage of the present model is that it allows an economic interpretation of such episodes, by
21means of historical decompositions.
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Note: Probability bands denote 5 and 95% pointwise draws for the difference in impulse response function between the two models.Figure 2: The External Finance Premium 









 Figure 3: The External Finance Premium: Other indicators 
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 Table 1: Prior and posterior distribution for structural parameters
Posterior mode Posterior sample Prior distribution
Mode st. err. 5% 50% 95% Type Mean st. err.
￿ K
￿ N inv. leverage 1.7681 0.1712 1.5707 1.8359 2.0912 Normal 2 0.2
￿ survival rate 0.9850 0.0086 0.9698 0.9816 0.9942 Beta 0.97 0.02
￿ elasticity 0.0567 0.0140 0.0374 0.0604 0.0821 Normal 0.05 0.02
￿ RK capital return 1.0137 0.0019 1.0106 1.0139 1.0171 Normal 1.015 0.002
’ investment adj cost 5.24 1.01 3.82 5.54 7.22 Normal 4 1.5
￿ consumption utility 2.26 0.23 1.85 2.22 2.61 Normal 1 0.375
h consumption habit 0.25 0.04 0.19 0.28 0.36 Beta 0.7 0.1
￿ labour utility 2.50 0.57 1.74 2.66 3.57 Normal 2 0.75
￿ ￿xed cost 1.67 0.07 1.56 1.68 1.79 Normal 1.25 0.125
  capital util adj cost 0.36 0.10 0.24 0.40 0.57 Gamma 0.2 0.075
￿w calvo wages 0.81 0.03 0.77 0.82 0.87 Beta 0.75 0.05
￿p calvo prices 0.91 0.01 0.89 0.91 0.93 Beta 0.75 0.05
￿w indexation wages 0.37 0.09 0.21 0.36 0.50 Beta 0.5 0.15
￿p indexation prices 0.39 0.08 0.27 0.41 0.54 Beta 0.5 0.15
r￿ in￿ ation 1.52 0.10 1.36 1.52 1.68 Normal 1.5 0.1
r￿￿ d(in￿ ation) 0.10 0.03 0.06 0.11 0.15 Gamma 0.3 0.1
rY output 0.14 0.04 0.09 0.17 0.25 Gamma 0.125 0.05
r￿Y d(output) 0.24 0.03 0.19 0.23 0.28 Gamma 0.063 0.05
￿ lagged interest rate 0.91 0.02 0.88 0.91 0.94 Beta 0.75 0.1
1Table 2: Prior and posterior distribution for parameters of shock processes
Posterior mode Posterior sample Prior distribution
Standard deviation Mode st. err. 5% 50% 95% Type LB UB
￿(^ "
a
t) ￿ productivity shock 0.49 0.02 0.45 0.49 0.54 Uniform 0 5
￿(^ "
B
t ) ￿ preference shock 0.29 0.11 0.16 0.39 0.62 Uniform 0 5
￿("G
t ) ￿ govt. spending shock 0.73 0.03 0.68 0.74 0.79 Uniform 0 5
￿(^ "
L
t ) ￿ labor supply shock 3.14 0.64 1.98 3.17 4.39 Uniform 0 5
￿(^ "
I
t) ￿ investment shock 0.76 0.06 0.68 0.78 0.88 Uniform 0 5
￿(￿R
t ) ￿ interest rate shock 0.21 0.02 0.17 0.21 0.24 Uniform 0 5
￿(￿￿
t ) ￿ in￿ ation objective shock 0.11 0.03 0.07 0.12 0.16 Uniform 0 5
￿(￿
p
t) ￿ price mark-up shock 0.29 0.02 0.27 0.30 0.33 Uniform 0 5
￿(￿w
t ) ￿ wage mark-up shock 0.29 0.02 0.27 0.29 0.32 Uniform 0 5
Persistence Mean st. err.
￿A ￿ productivity shock 0.98 0.01 0.97 0.98 0.99 Beta 0.85 0.1
￿B ￿ preference shock 0.84 0.07 0.66 0.80 0.93 Beta 0.85 0.1
￿G ￿ govt. spending shock 0.98 0.01 0.96 0.97 0.99 Beta 0.85 0.1
￿L ￿ labor supply shock 0.94 0.02 0.91 0.94 0.97 Beta 0.85 0.1
￿I ￿ investment shock 0.63 0.06 0.54 0.63 0.73 Beta 0.85 0.1
2Table 3: Variance decompositions: 5% ￿ 95% bounds
Output Premium
Shock t = 1 t = 10 t = 20 t = 1 t = 10 t = 20
^ "
A
t 0:02 ￿ 0:06 0:11 ￿ 0:24 0:15 ￿ 0:34 0:00 ￿ 0:03 0:00 ￿ 0:01 0:01 ￿ 0:02
^ "
B
t 0:05 ￿ 0:12 0:01 ￿ 0:04 0:01 ￿ 0:03 0:04 ￿ 0:12 0:01 ￿ 0:02 0:01 ￿ 0:03
"G
t 0:31 ￿ 0:42 0:12 ￿ 0:19 0:11 ￿ 0:19 0:00 ￿ 0:01 0:00 ￿ 0:00 0:00 ￿ 0:01
^ "
I
t 0:23 ￿ 0:34 0:17 ￿ 0:34 0:13 ￿ 0:26 0:47 ￿ 0:72 0:80 ￿ 0:92 0:85 ￿ 0:94
^ "
L
t 0:05 ￿ 0:15 0:11 ￿ 0:30 0:11 ￿ 0:31 0:02 ￿ 0:11 0:01 ￿ 0:04 0:01 ￿ 0:03
￿￿
t 0:02 ￿ 0:06 0:03 ￿ 0:09 0:02 ￿ 0:08 0:02 ￿ 0:09 0:01 ￿ 0:03 0:00 ￿ 0:02
￿R
t 0:05 ￿ 0:12 0:08 ￿ 0:23 0:07 ￿ 0:22 0:09 ￿ 0:27 0:03 ￿ 0:10 0:02 ￿ 0:07
￿P
t 0:01 ￿ 0:02 0:01 ￿ 0:05 0:01 ￿ 0:04 0:00 ￿ 0:01 0:00 ￿ 0:00 0:00 ￿ 0:00
￿W
t 0:00 ￿ 0:01 0:00 ￿ 0:00 0:00 ￿ 0:00 0:00 ￿ 0:01 0:00 ￿ 0:01 0:00 ￿ 0:01
3